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Abstract
Using game-level panel data on the National Basketball Association for 2015-2016 season, I
examine the relationship between trade and team performance. In my study, trade is measured by
a game-minute-adjusted salary dispersion. I construct a fixed effect model to analyze the effect
of salary dispersion on team performance. The results show that salary dispersion is negatively
related to team performance. To verify whether different team characteristics will affect this
relationship, I categorize the teams into two groups twice based on their playoff likelihood and
number of trades made. The results provide additional evidence that salary dispersion influence
team performance negatively. The findings suggest that a compressed salary structures lead to
more productivity in the NBA.
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I.

Introduction
Empirical investigations have shown that the uncertainty of the outcome of games or the

league championship is a significant factor explaining a league's total revenue (Kesenne 2000).
To guarantee a more balanced competition, league authorities have always tried to regulate the
player labor market and to prevent the concentration of talent on one team (Michie and Oughton
2004). A salary cap, as one of the institutional regulations, was introduced in the NBA during the
1984-1985 season, and was used to limit the ability of high revenue teams to acquire the more
talented players. In recent years, salary caps have continuously increased in size in the NBA
since the 2013-2014 season. Consequently, most players are not willing to sign long contracts
because they will lose the opportunities to gain higher salaries in the future of their career. This
phenomenon causes an instability of team rosters, and as such, trades between teams happen
more frequently than before. In 2015-2016 season, 43 players (including four currently overseas)
switched teams. That sum accounts for nearly 10% of the entire league, and represents almost a
50% increase from 2005. While salary caps in other North American sports leagues, such as the
NFL, also increased in recent years, this distinct trading trend only occurred in the NBA. One
potential explanation is that NBA payrolls have a soft cap that allows more flexibility for trading
than the hard cap in the NFL. Therefore, it is important to know how trading trends affect the
league. Specifically, I will study the relationship between trade and team performance in the
NBA and test whether trade will hurt the competitive balance.
In terms of measuring trade, none of the sports economic papers in the current literature
provide any methodology. Katayama and Nuch (2011) provides evidence that trades affect the
salary structures of the team and therefore change the salary dispersion, which implies the wage
distribution of the team. Therefore, although with limitation, I believe that variation in salary

5

dispersion can represent the trade, at least to some degree. I collect a dataset that contains
player's salary and game-level statistics for the 2015-2016 season to study the balancing effect of
trading for the National Basketball Association (NBA). In the first step, I formulate an estimation
model similar to Katayama and Nuch (2011) and test the relationship between salary dispersion
and team performance in NBA for the 2015-2016 season. My empirical results confirm that
better performance is associated with lower salary dispersion which is consistent with the results
from the fixed effects model in Katayama and Nuch (2011), but against the results from Frick,
Prinz, and Winkelman (2003) and Berri and Jewell (2004).
Literature suggests that the owners of sports teams can be either profit maximizers or win
maximizers (e.g. Ferguson et al., 1991 and Zimbalist, 2003). Therefore, teams in different
situations tend to trade players for different purposes. For instance, on one hand, teams that are
less likely to get into the playoffs may sacrifice talented players for draft picks and young players
so they may be able to improve team performance in future seasons. As better performance leads
to better win-loss ratios and higher attendance (Cebula, 2013), teams are able to maximize profits
through better performance. On the other hand, teams that are more likely to get into the playoffs
or win a title look for talented players to improve team performance and thereby maximize their
wins. I believe the relationship between salary dispersion varies for teams in different situations.
I categorized 30 teams into two groups based on the odds that they would get into the playoffs.
The first group includes 6 teams that have less than 5% chance to get into the playoffs, namely
lower potential ranked group, according to FiveThirtyEight’s NBA forecast before the season
starts. The second group includes the remaining 6 teams whose chances to get into the playoffs
are greater than 90%, namely higher potential ranked group. Then I analyzed the relationship
between salary dispersion and team performance separately for two groups in the same
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regression model with fixed effects. Results show that effects of salary dispersion are not clear
for the teams in these two groups. Considering trade will affect the relationship between salary
dispersion and team performance, I also categorize 30 teams into two groups based on the
number of transactions each of them made during 2015-2016 season. The first group includes 15
teams that trade less than 5 times during that season. The second group includes the remaining
15 teams that trade more than 5 times during that season. Results show that trade might enhance
the effect of salary dispersion on team performance.
One feature that distinguishes this study from those in the current literature is that we use
individual game outcomes to measure variables such as team performance and salary dispersion.
Season-level analysis of team performance may put too much weight on those players who did
not play and only one salary structure per season is available. Salary structure of a team is
believed to vary throughout the season. By using game-level data and thereby exploiting
information not used in season-level analyses, I am able to gauge the exact extent of participation
for each player and provide further insights into the effect of salary dispersion. Katayama and
Nuch (2011) mention mid-season trades as a main factor that affect the salary structure of the
team but haven't considered the trade as a control variable in the model. Berri and Jewell (2004)
point out the importance of team stability as a determinant of team success. However, team
stability is not able to measure trades since other factors such as injuries and age will also affect
the team stability (Lee and Jeon 2009). Taylor and Trogdon (2002) provide evidence that
tournament incentive will affect the team performance through two conditions: Strong teams that
desire the title have tournament incentives to win and teams that are relatively weak have
tournament incentives to lose since they will have higher draft orders as prizes for their low
rankings. Therefore, I introduce four dummy variables to control tournament incentives in my
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study of salary dispersion which Katayama and Nuch (2011) have not taken into accounts.
Moreover, by categorizing teams into different groups based on playoff likelihood and frequency
of trade, my paper further studies the relationship between salary dispersion and team
performance under different situations. Consequently, my study is more comprehensive than
past studies based on a more accurate measure of salary dispersion, additional control variables
and comparative studies. The results from this study can be used to explain the efficiency of
policies related to total spending such as salary cap and luxury taxes and how these policies
affect the salary dispersion and team performance.
This game-level study provides additional evidence for the relationship between salary
dispersion and team performance in the NBA based on a more complete model which takes
additional factors such as elimination effect and number of trades. However, it is difficult to
interpret the trading effects efficiently according to the estimation results from my study. Further
research is needed to investigate specifically the immediate effect of trade on salary dispersion
and team performance. Therefore, I will then be able to further discuss the effect of trade on
team performance and generate further implications for owners and the league.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents existing literature
relevant to this study. Section 3 introduces an empirical model of salary dispersion and team
performance and explains the construction of each variable. Section 4 describes the data used in
the study. Section 5 demonstrates the empirical results. The implications are discussed in Section
6 and the conclusions are presented in Section 7. Section 8 presents the tables of summary
statistics and estimation results.
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II.

Literature Review

Competitive Balance
Competitive balance refers to balance between the sporting capabilities of teams. The
more evenly balanced strengths of teams will lead to a more uncertain outcome of each match
and of the championship race. In a perfectly balanced league, each team would have an equal
chance of winning each match and therefore have an equal chance of winning the league title
(Zimbalist, 2002). Moreover, in a perfectly balanced league it would be impossible to predict
which team is more likely to win or where the title is going with any certainty. The theory of
competitive balance in team sports was first developed by Rottenberg (1956). He points out that
the nature of the industry is such that competitors must be of approximately equal size if any are
to be successful, which is a unique attribute of professional competitive sports. Since that time,
economists have contributed rigorous theoretical and empirical work on various aspects of
competitive balance. These contributions include formal measures of balance within a league
(such as the standard deviation of win percentage and the concentration of championships);
league rules regarding free agency, restricting entry, and expansion; cross-subsidization schemes
such as reserve and draft systems, caps, and revenue sharing; and the connection between payroll
and performance (Zimbalist, 2002).
Michie and Oughton (2004) use several measures, such as Herfindahl index and C5 index
to study the competitive balance in English soccer league for the period 1947-2003. They
indicate the importance of competitive balance, arguing that uncertainty of outcomes generate
interest from supporters and increases demand for watching matches both live and on television.
An increase in competitive balance has the effect of shifting the demand curve for viewing
matches outward. Therefore, maintaining and promoting competitive balance becomes one of the
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priority goals for both clubs and leagues to maximize profits. Additionally, their study illustrates
that competitive balance is important to ensure league stability. Unbalanced leagues will face
increased risks of bankruptcy of lagging clubs and threats of league break-up from new or rival
leagues. They also find that the decline in competitive balance experienced by the English
Premier League is associated with a widening income gap between the leading and lagging
clubs. Given the existence of a positive relationship between wage expenditure and league
performance (e.g. Hall et al. 2002), the increasing gap between rich and poor has enabled the top
clubs to increase their dominance of the league (as measured by, for example, share of points)
and has resulted in a decline in competitive balance. They suggest that the Premier League and
UEFA can guard against these risks by re-examining their redistribution rules. A more
egalitarian distribution of income will help the lagging clubs increase their shares of total
revenue and thereby increase the competitive balance.
While the sports leagues always want to prevent themselves from unbalancing, team
owners' objectives are sometimes inconsistent with that of the league. There has been some
empirical work attempting to decipher the true objective function of team owners, but results
from different literature are inconclusive. Zimbalist (2003) has a theoretical study on the owner's
objective. He finds that the team itself is often not managed as a profit center, but rather as a
vehicle for promoting the owner's other investments. For instance, George Steinbrenner used his
New York Yankees to create the YES regional sports network in the nation's largest media
market, which had a market value upward of $850m in 2001. Therefore, owners may find that
the best way to profit maximize globally is to win maximize at the team level. In summary, one
conclusion to draw from the discussion of Zimbalist (2003) is that owners maximize global longterm returns rather than team's reported annual operating profits. However, the author fails to
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further apply the results to owner's behaviors. For instance, how will owners with different
objectives made transaction decisions differently. In my paper, I will specifically study how
different situations affect the relationship between trade and team performance.

Zimbalist

(2003) also points out that when owner investment in player's yields returns to both the ball club
and to other businesses of the owners, the revenue gap between clubs can become larger; this
may be a significant additional source of league imbalance. Team's win maximization or profit
maximization behaviors will hurt the league's goal of competitive balance. Consequently,
institutions are introduced to limit the ability of concentration talent and protect the balance of
the league.
Institutions to protect competitive balance
Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) list the potential factors including many institutions and
off-the-field rules that may affect the degree of competitive balance in any professional sports
league. Policies related to salary cap have been introduced to all four North American major
sports leagues and are now an integral part of the regulation system in those same leagues. Salary
caps emerged from the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement with the players’ union in 1998
and early 1999 in reaction to the league’s leaky team payroll cap. A salary cap is a direct
restriction, setting both a ceiling and a floor on the amount of salaries paid by a club to all its
players, and thereby limits the ability of high revenue teams to acquire the more talented players.
The big difference between the salary restrictions in the NBA and the NFL is that NBA payrolls
have a soft cap, which has exceptions to the limits imposed by cap. This fact implies the
phenomenon that more transactions happened only in the NBA as the salary cap increased.
Because all of the exceptions have undermined the soft cap, the NBA developed a number of
supplemental measures to reinforce the policy, which includes luxury tax and individual salary

11

cap. The NBA is the only U.S men’s professional sports league currently using individual player
salary caps. Results from Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) show that the individual salary caps
are likely to increase competitive imbalance because they encourage players to rely more on their
preference for joining a winning team than on differences between salary offers.
Dietl et al. (2011) analyze the effects of salary cap in a league with win-maximizing clubs
and flexible talent supply based on a game-theoretic model. The results show that a percentageof revenue salary cap increases competitive balance and decreases overall salary payments in the
league, thereby contributing to financial stability and more balance. The study further highlights
the potential conflicts between the league and society that the effect of salary cap on social
welfare depends on fans’ preference because fans determine the talent allocation in the
unregulated league. In general, a salary cap increases social welfare if fans have high preferences
for aggregate talent or favor an unbalanced league. In contrast, if fans have high preference for
competitive balance, the salary cap policy will reduce social welfare. One of the limitations of
this paper is that the authors simply assume that clubs try to maximize wins. However, according
to Zimbalist (2003), there are some clubs try to maximize profits instead of wins. Therefore,
further study needs to consider whether the effects of salary cap will change if profit maximizing
clubs are involved in the league. Also, further studies can focus on whether different types of
salary caps in NBA affect the competitive balance differently.
Kesenne (2000) sets up a two club model and analyzes the impacts of payroll cap and
individual cap on competitive balance in a professional team sports league. Without the
regulation of any salary cap, the model shows that the big club will hire more players with high
talent than the small club because bigger market size will generate more marginal revenue to pay
the payrolls. Also, the salary difference between the star players and grass-roots players can be

12

very large if top players are in short supply. When introducing the payroll salary cap into the
model, the results show that this salary cap policy does improve the competitive balance in a
league through the improvement of player salary distribution. The payroll cap holds down the
excessive top player salaries which guarantee the club owners of both small and big clubs a
reasonable profit rate to attract new investments. They use the same model to test the impact of
the individual cap and compare the outcomes with and without the individual cap. Under
regulation of an individual cap, the top players will prefer to play for the bigger clubs, since
bigger clubs are able to offer them more non-wage or fringe benefits on top of their salary.
Therefore, the individual cap actually makes the competitive balance become more unequal. The
study provides evidence to support the assumption about the impacts of salary caps in Sanderson
and Siegfried (2003). Moreover, it confirms that it is necessary to have these regulations because
agents and owners might be irrational that either ignoring the negative external effect of an
unbalanced league or bidding up top players' salaries in a free agency market.
Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) believe that the reverse-order entry draft may also impact
the competitive balance. This policy allows teams to select players according to their order of
finish in the previous season. The team with the worst record chooses first, followed by the
second-worst team and so forth. The draft policy is believed to promote competitive balance by
allocating the best new players to the weakest teams. The NBA, as a special tournament, offers
rewards for both winning and losing. Therefore, weaker teams are believed to have incentives for
losing in order to get higher draft orders. Taylor and Trogdon (2002) examine three NBA
seasons to determine whether team performance responds to changes in the underlying
tournament incentives provided by the NBA’s introduction and restructuring of the lottery
system to determine draft order. They build up an empirical model to test the effects of the
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tournaments incentives on winning percentage. A dummy variable that determined the homeaway factor is included in the model to control for the effect that venue has on the outcome of
any particular game. The results on the elimination variable confirm their presumption that nonplayoff teams are incentivized to lose in order to gain higher draft positions. Although the league
adjusted the draft policy from reverse-order to weighted-lottery in 1989-1990, the eliminated
teams were still found to lose approximately twice as often as playoff-bound teams. Once
eliminated from contention, teams could do better by decreasing winning efforts and moving
down in the league standings. Although the reverse-order draft policy is introduced as a promoter
of competitive balance, the study shows that it may also worsen competitive balance since it
rewards failure with high draft picks. If teams are forward looking, the elimination effect may
exist before teams are statistically eliminated from playoff consideration. However, the study
estimates a model, which includes a variable that captures a team’s (and its opponent’s) relative
playoff likelihood, and finds no evidence to support this hypothesis. Further research needs to
re-examine this hypothesis and find more implications related to this elimination effect. For
instance, it is interesting to study whether elimination effect will affect transaction behaviors
among teams. According to the results from this paper and Zimbalist (2003), I assume that some
eliminated teams or teams with high possibilities to be eliminated might trade star players or
players with high salaries for young players or draft picks. In my study, I am going to take
tournament incentives into account when analyzing the relationship between trade and
performance.
Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) also discuss the impact of revenue sharing on
competitive balance. Revenue sharing is believed to improve the balance in the league by
equalizing teams’ profits and demand for talent. Additionally, they list other rules such as
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relocation restrictions and revenue enhancements that may also affect the competitive balance in
different ways. However, my study analyzes the competitive balance at the game level using
only data from one season, and these factors will not be taken into account in my model since
rules and institutions are unlikely to change during the season.
Factors affect team performance
Hall et al. (2002) use data on team payrolls in MLB between 1980 and 2000 to examine
the causality between payroll and team performance. The result shows that cross-section
correlation between payroll and performance increased significantly in the 1990s. As a
comparison, the paper also examines the relationship between pay and performance in English
soccer, and it is shown that higher payrolls will lead to better performance. This study provides
evidence that supports the reversible causality between payroll and performance. While payroll
of each player is determined by the individual performance, the allocation of better individual
performance always leads to better team performance. The evidences from Hall et al. supports
Kesenne (2002) that the revenue gaps will make the league more unbalanced as richer clubs tend
to generate more revenues and thereby hire more talented players. This fact highlights the
importance of salary cap related policy and the reexamination of distribution rules, which are
mentioned in Michie and Oughton (2004).
Although evidences show that higher payroll will lead to higher performance. Under the
restriction of salary cap, it is unclear which salary structure leads to better performance.
Economic theories of the firm provide two differing predictions on the effect of different salary
structures. Some argue that a compressed salary structure leads to harmony among group
members, thereby increasing productivity (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). On the contrary,
others suggest that greater salary disparity elicits higher levels of efforts among group members
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and therefore increases productivity (e.g. Lazer and Rosen, 1981). These differing opinions
motivate further study on this topic.
Frick et al. (2003) use Gini-index as the disparity measure to study the relationship
between win percentage and salary dispersion on a fixed effects model for the North American
major leagues. According to their estimates, a higher degree of intra-team wage dispersion is
beneficial to the performance of professional basketball teams. This implies that a single "star
player" may be of paramount importance for the team's performance, which will lead to a highly
skewed distribution of player salaries. On the contrary, since the size of the squad is significantly
higher in baseball and football, an individual player's impact on the performance of his team is
likely to be much smaller than in basketball. The results show a higher degree of inequality is
associated with a poorer performance, which is consistent with their hypothesis. Combining the
results from different professional sports leagues, they conclude that a higher degree of wage
inequality can have a positive as well as negative influence on team performance depending on
the specific circumstances of the production process, especially the size of the team. One
omission of this study pointed out by the authors is that they have not explicitly controlled for
changes in the composition of teams over time. Changes in the composition of teams affect their
team performance: the higher the turnover rate, the poorer is the performance. Moreover, they
argue that it is interesting to take a closer look at different policies that used to curtail total
spending and to ask whether these have any influence on intra-team salary structures and,
therefore, also on team performance.
Berri and Jewell (2004) use Herfindahl index to measure dispersion and estimate the
relationship between wage dispersion and team performance with six seasons of data in the
NBA. The authors believe that team chemistry is also an important determinate of team success,
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while the roster stability will promote the level of team chemistry. Conversely, worker turnover
is believed to undermine the level of team chemistry and thereby reduce the team performance.
Consequently, they construct a measure of roster stability to control team chemistry by
calculating the percentage of team minutes played by players who played for a team in both the
current and prior seasons. Change in the stability of the team's roster is not found to statistically
impact the change in team winning percentage. Salary dispersion is also not found to be a
significant determinant of team wins. Results suggest that only the quality of players and quality
of coaching matter in terms of team wins. Therefore, the authors argue that further research
could investigate how changes in salary dispersion directly impact player performance rather
than investigating the phenomenon through the lens of firm performance.
Using game-level panel data on the NBA, Katayama and Nuch (2011) examine the
causal effect of within-team salary dispersion on team performance. According to the study, a
sporting team in a professional sports league, like the NBA, can have a number of salary
structures throughout the season as the team rosters are continually updated and players may
experience injuries and mid-season trades. As a result, the study analyzes at a game level in order
to catch the exact extent of participation for each player. The study builds up a unique dataset,
which covers five regular seasons from 2002 to 2006, while the variables used in the study are
calculated from a reduced dataset that includes the first game of each season for each match-up
of teams. The variable of salary dispersion is measured by three different methods. The first
measure is adjusted for the number of minutes played by each player in each game, thereby
accounting for the heterogeneous level of participation among players within a game. The second
measure is the Herfindahl index, which is constructed using only those who played more than
half of their team’s games in a season. The third measure is the Gini coefficient, which is
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constructed using team rosters of all players who had participated in at least one game during a
season. The authors first construct a fixed effects model. Then, they argue that the fixed effects
estimator may be inconsistent because of the endogeneity of average salary measure and salary
dispersion measure. Both measures depend on the number of game-minutes played by players
and therefore is determined jointly with the game outcome. Consequently, they eliminate the
fixed effects by differencing the equation of the fixed effect model and estimate the average
salary and salary dispersion in the Generalized method of moments (GMM) framework. The
GMM method requires that a certain number of moment conditions were specified for the model.
These moment conditions are functions of the model parameters and the data, such that their
expectation is zero at the true values of the parameters. The GMM method then minimizes a
certain norm of the sample averages of the moment conditions and provides the most efficient
estimates on the basis of moment conditions available. The study finds that team average salaries
are an important determinant of team performance, since the coefficient on average salary
measure is positive and significant at the 1% level. When the average salary among active
players is high, the team is more likely to actualize a win. Results based on GMM estimator
indicate that salary dispersion is unrelated to season winning percentage whichever dispersion
measure is used, which is consistent with the results from the season-level analysis. However,
since the coefficient of salary dispersion measures based on the fixed effects estimator are
negative and significant, they argue that a bigger dataset could provide more accurate estimates
and their GMM estimates might turn out to be significant.
Just as firms must consider the impact of changes in management, sports teams must
consider whether a coaching change will improve the team performance. Coaching turnover has
been considered in a variety of team sport settings. Roach (2013) examine the effects of coaching
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changes for NFL teams between the 1995 and 2012 seasons on a regression model including
team-specific fixed effects. The author finds that firing a coach reduces a team's expected
performance during the next season and the team's average performance over the next two
seasons. He provides a potential explanation for the results that the productivity and efficiency
are determined by experience according to the learning curve. Coaches and players with more
experiences tend to have higher productivities.
Staw and Hoang (1995) study the sunk-cost effect in the context of professional
basketball. In this case, sunk costs are operationalized by the order in which players were
selected in the college draft. They believe that draft order can be used to predict playing time,
being traded and survival in the NBA. They use the NBA draft to determine the initial cost of
players and then examine whether this cost influences the amount players are utilized by teams
and the length of time they are retained by NBA franchises. The sample included 241 players
selected from the 1980-1986 drafts who eventually received contracts and played at least two
years in the NBA. Additionally, they create three indices of player performance: scoring,
toughness, and quickness, and control additional variables such as injuries, illness, and trade,
which might also affect player’s performance. Scoring factor consists of points per minute, fieldgoal percentage, and free-throw percentage. This factor explains 30 percent of the variance in the
sample of forwards and centers, whereas it accounts for 23 percent of the variance in the sample
of guards. Results show that a player’s scoring is the primary performance variable associated
with greater playing time over the five years’ data, while the occurrence of an injury or being
traded are also consistent predictors of minutes played. The draft order is a significant predictor
of minutes played since teams are more willing to develop players with high potentials; this
effect is above and beyond any other effects of a player’s performance such as scoring.
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III.

Methodology

Estimation model
In studying the performance of sports teams, performance levels are typically measured
by the winning percentages of each team at the end of the season. In other words, team
performance measures are an aggregate of the outcomes of individual games throughout the
season. Consequently, a great deal of information tends to be discarded, including who
participated in individual games and for how long they played. Such information may
nonetheless be vitally relevant to the analysis of team performance and salary structures in sports
that involve significant player turnover and mid-game interchange. The effect that salary
structures have on team performance is potentially dependent on which players are active
members of the team. Although two teams may have the same salary structure and the same
number of players, the playing time distributions of them are different. For instance, a team may
let their best players play longer time, the other team may have a more even spread of game time.
If so, season-level analysis of team performance may put too much weight on those players who
did not play. Additionally, as mentioned in the literature review section, a sporting league like
the NBA can be considered to have a number of salary structures throughout the season. A
season-level analysis only provides one salary structure for each team per season, which fails to
capture the effects of trades during the mid-season. Thus, I analyze the case at game level where
the measure of salary dispersion that is based on a more accurate depiction of team composition.
My measure of salary dispersion is based on game level rosters and game outcomes are used as
performance measures. My estimation model is inspired by Katayama and Nuch (2011) study on
salary dispersion, in which a production function for team performance for a given season is
considered first:
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𝑦# = 𝐴# 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟# , 𝑋# , 𝜇# , 𝜀# , 𝑓 𝑎2# 𝑙2# , … , 𝑎5# 𝑙5#

(1)

where 𝑦# is the team performance of team i, 𝑙5# is the labor input of player k (k=1,...K), 𝑎5# is the
player's skill level, 𝐴# is the scale of production which is assumed to be a function of salary
dispersion (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟# ), team characteristics such as coaching quality 𝑋# , team-specific timeinvariant unobserved factor (𝜇# ), and an idiosyncratic error (𝜀# ). On the basis of the relationship
in the Equation 1 above, the following estimation model for game-level data is considered:
𝑌#:; = 𝛽= + 𝛽2 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#:; + 𝛽@ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#:; + 𝛽A 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑#:; +
𝛽D 𝑒𝑥𝑝#:; +𝛽F 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#:; +𝛽I 𝑂𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#:; + 𝛽K ∆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚#,#:; + 𝛽N ∆𝑂𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚#,#:; + 𝜇#: + 𝜀#:; (2)
where 𝑌#:; = 𝑌#,#:; /𝑌:,#:; is the ratio of the point scored by team i to that by team j in the game
where i is at home against j in season t, 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#:; = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#,#:; /𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙:,#:; is the ratio of
measures of average salaries, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#:; = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#,#:; /𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟:,#:; is the ratio of salary dispersion
measures, 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑#:; = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑#,#:; /𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑:,#:; is the ratio of coaches' records, 𝑒𝑥𝑝#:; =
𝑒𝑥𝑝#,#:; /𝑒𝑥𝑝:,#:; is the ratio of coaches' experiences, 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#:; is the dummy variable which
determines whether the team i has clinched playoff berth at the time team i versus home against
team j in season t , 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚#,#:; is the dummy variable which determines whether the team i has been
eliminated from playoff at the time team i at home against team j in season t, 𝜇#: is an
unobserved fixed effect for matches of team i at home against j and 𝜀#:; is an idiosyncratic error.
Note that match-ups ij and ji are not the same, as the former indicate i being at home and the
latter denotes j at home. Additionally, since my study only uses data for 2015-2016 season, I do
not need to include the t in my model, which represents change in seasons. The Equation 2 is a
general form that can apply to study on this topic across season.
I apply this fixed effect regression model to study the relationship between salary
dispersion and team performance at game level. I first run the regression for all thirty teams.
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Taylor and Trogdon (2002) point out that the tournament in the NBA offers prizes to both
winners and losers. I believe that teams will trade players for different purposes according to
their situations measured by odds of getting into playoff. Consequently, I categorize 30 teams
into two groups according to the pre-season playoff likelihoods prediction done by
FiveThirtyEight's NBA forecast. FiveThirtyEight created CARMELO, a system that projects the
careers of every current NBA player by identifying similar players throughout league history.
They combined the CARMELO system with Elo ratings, which is a system for calculating the
relative skill levels of players in competitor-versus-competitor games. They used this combined
system called “CARM-Elo” to calculate win probabilities and point spread for every NBA game
and determine which teams have the best shot to make the playoffs or win the finals. Additional
factors that will affect the game outcomes such as fatigue, travel and altitude, were also taken
into account in their calculation process. Then they simulated the regular season 10,000 times to
find the average final record of each team and the percentage of simulations that each team
makes the playoffs. They used the NBA tiebreaking rules to seed teams in the playoffs and then
simulate the playoffs 10,000 times to find the winner of the finals. The odds of each team makes
playoff vary from less than 1% to greater than 99% according to the forecast before the 20152016 season starts. The predication is closed to the final results in that season. All the teams that
have more than 45% odds got into the playoffs except three teams, these teams being the
Chicago Bulls, Washington Wizards and New Orleans Pelicans. Note that both Chicago Bulls
and Washington Wizard fight for the entrance ticket until the end of the regular seasons. All the
teams that that has less than 6% odds were eliminated from the playoffs. There are two teams,
including Dallas Mavericks and Portland Blazers, that also clinched the playoff although their
odds of making playoff are 29% and 23% respectively before the season started. The first group
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in my model includes 6 teams whose have more than 90% chances to get into the playoffs,
namely higher potential ranked teams. These teams, including Cleveland Cavaliers, Golden State
Warriors, Oklahoma City Thunders, San Antonio Spurs, Los Angle Clippers and Boston Celtics,
look for talent players in the trading market in order to improve their performance and win more
games. The second group in my model including 6 teams that have less than 5% chance to get
into playoff, namely lower potential ranked teams. This six teams in this group are the Brooklyn
Nets, Denver Nuggets, Los Angeles Lakers, Minnesota Timberwolves, New York Knicks and
Philadelphia 76ers. These teams statistically understand that they are unlikely to get into the
playoffs before the season starts. Therefore, according to the hypothesis mentioned in Taylor and
Trogdon. (2002), these teams might prefer to get a lower rank so that they will have higher draft
order for the next season. These teams may sacrifice their talented players for future draft picks
and young potential players
In order to have a closer look at the effect of trade on performance, I also categorize 30
teams into two groups based on numbers of transactions done by each team during 2015-2016
season. Note that each time a team trades, waives, or signs a player, this counts as one
transaction. The numbers of transactions among each team vary from 0 to 29 times in 2015-2016
season. I categorize 15 teams that made more than 5 transactions as group one, namely high trade
group. Note that the Memphis Grizzlies made 29 transactions in that season. The second group
includes the remaining 15 teams that made less than 5 transactions in that season, namely low
trade group. The groups are categorized based on the distribution of number of transactions made
in that season. I apply the same fixed effect model to these two groups and examine whether
trading behavior will affect the relationship between salary dispersion and team performance.
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Note that in Equation 2, several variables are made up of the ratio between two teams.
The dependent variable represents not absolute but relative performance measures which is
considered to be more relevant to the production of competitive sports teams according to Zak et
al. (1979). Similarly, the independent variables represent ratios of relative inputs. For example,
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#:; measures the salary dispersion in their relative levels between team i and j. The
estimation results should be interpreted accordingly. In order to clarify the roles of each
independent variable in Equation 2, I will explain how these variables are constructed. The
details will be discussed in the following section.
Variable construction
I construct these variables according to the methods provided by Katayama and Nuch
(2011). The variable 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#,#: is define as 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#,#: =

QRSTU ∙WXTU,UY
WXTU,UY

, where 𝑠𝑎𝑙5# is the salary

of player k in team i, 𝑚𝑝5#,#: is the number of game-minutes played by player k in team i in
match-up ij and Ki is the number of players in team i. That is, 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#,#: is a weighted average of
salaries of the team members in that game where the share of the minutes played by each player
is used as a weight. This variable is considered to control for 𝑓 𝑎2# 𝑙2# , … , 𝑎5# 𝑙5# in Equation 1,
given that player salaries are associated with player-specific production statistics in past studies
on NBA(e.g. Lee and Jeon, 2009). The variable 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#: is constructed on the basis of players
who actually participated in a given game. It is the game-minute-adjusted coefficient of variation,
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#,#: =

ZR[QRSU,UY

\.]

RZ^QRSU,UY

, where 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙#,#: =

(QRSTU _RZ^QRSU,UY )` ∙WXTU,UY
WXTU,UY

. This measure is adjusted

for the number of minutes played by each player in each game. Note that the 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#,#: varies
across each game; so does the ratio of salary dispersion between two teams. Since team quality
and coaching turnover will also affect the performance (e.g. Katayama and Nuch 2011; Roach
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2013) , I construct two variables, 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑#: and 𝑒𝑥𝑝#: to control the team characteristics. The
coaches' records variable is measured by the ratio of the coaches' losses to his total previous
games, while the coaches' experiences variable is measured as total number of games in which
the coach had previously taken part as a head coach.
Taylor (2002) notes that NBA teams respond to tournament incentives by changes in
performance. Therefore, I create four dummy variables to control this characteristic of team i and
team j. I set 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#: equal to 1 if team i has already clinched a playoff spot when playing at
home against j, and set it equal to 0 if not. Similarly, 𝑂𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#: equal to 1 if team i's opponent,
namely team j, has already clinched a playoff spot when i playing at home against j, and it equal
to 0 if team j has not clinched a playoff spot yet. I set 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚#,#: equal to 1 if team i has been
eliminated from playoff, and set it equal to 0 if not. Similarly, 𝑂𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚#,#: equal to 1 if team i's
opponent, namely team j has been eliminate from playoff and it equals 0 if not.

IV.

Data
This study constructs a dataset, which focuses on only one regular NBA season 2015-

2016. I choose the 2015-2016 season as my sample because there were more frequent trades
between teams during that season compared to any other season. Hence, I believe that the results
based on this sample set will be representative for my topic. The dataset includes information on
players who participated in games for this season. The variables used in this study are calculated
according to the formulas we presented in last section and the game-level panel consists of 1,316
unique games in total. The salary data is taken from basketball-reference.com. In the dataset, all
players had at least one salary figure quoted for each season. When a player moved or was traded
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from one team to another, his salary figures in the respective teams are sometimes not available.
In such a case, his last known salary for season 2015-2016 is used in my study.
The game-level statistics used in this study are taken from the box scores of the regular
NBA season 2015-2016, sourced from basketball-reference.com. They include individual
performance statistics such as points scored and minutes played for all players who participated
in the game. Table 1 shows a sample of my data set. I use the salary data and game minutes
played data collected to calculating the average salary measure and salary dispersion measure for
each game and each team according to the formula I constructed in section 3.
Table 2-7 presents summary statistics of the variables used for estimation which includes
game level data of all 30 teams, 6 high potential ranked teams, 6 low potential ranked teams, 15
teams trade more than 5 times, and 15 teams trade less than 5 times respectively. The mean of
each variable is around one, which is expected, as the variables are the ratio of competing teams’
statistics. When the ratio is greater than one, it means that the value of that variable of team i is
greater than the value of that variable of team j. According the Table 2, the mean of ratio of
average salary is 1.322, which is reasonable since some teams have higher total team payrolls.
This shows that despite the existence of salary caps, which aim to establish some level of equity
between teams, large discrepancies between teams at the game level are still possible when it
comes to salaries of actively participating players. There is a good deal of variation in each of the
variables, including those relating to salaries. In a single game, the participating members of one
team may have up to four times the level of salary dispersion compared to its opponent. Note
that the mean of average salary measure in Table 3 is larger than that of average salary measure
in Table 4. This evidence indicates that strong teams are likely to pay more salaries than weak
teams. The means of salary dispersion measure in Table 5 are higher than that of salary
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dispersion measure in Table 6, which suggests that trade might decrease the amount of variations
in salaries. The ratios of coaches' experiences in all summary statistics are very high, which
suggest that the difference in coaches' experiences is significant in the league.

V.

Estimation results
Table 8 presents the estimation results when including every team in the NBA. I estimate

the model using the standard fixed-effects method. The coefficient on 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#:; is found to be
negative and significant at the 5% level. An increase in the ratio of salary dispersion by 10% will
cause the ratio of score to decrease by 0.28%. This indicates that better team performance is
associated with lower salary dispersion, which is in sharp contrast with evidence provided by
Frick et al. (2003) and Berri and Jewell (2004) but consistent with the results from the fixed
effects model in Katayama and Nuch (2011). The coefficient on 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#,#: is positive and
significant at the 5% level. 10% increase in ratio of average salary will increase the ratio of team
score by 0.55%. Not surprisingly, teams with higher average salaries appear to have better game
outcomes. 𝑂𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚:,#:; is positively related to the ratio of score. As O𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚:,#:; changes from 0 to 1,
the ratio of score increase by 5.7%, which confirm the results from Taylor and Trogdon (2002)
that non-playoff teams have incentives to lose in order to gain higher draft positions in the next
season. Both coefficients on the 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#:; and 𝑂𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ:,#:; 𝑎𝑟𝑒 negative and significant. Note
that the effects of clinching a playoff invitation are confounding. For those teams which have
already clinched the playoff, some of them may still have the incentive to win in order to move
up their rankings and capture more home court advantage the further they advance in the
playoffs. On the other hand, other teams may choose to rest key players to make better
preparation for the playoff games. As 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ:,#:; changes from 0 to 1, the ratio of score decreases
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by 4.3%. This is reasonable since top players will be rested to prepare for the competition in the
playoffs. As 𝑂𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ:,#:; changes from 0 to 1, the ratio of score decreases by 3%. The negative
relationship between 𝑂𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#:; and ratio of final points may be explained by the intense
competition in rankings. Since the gap between teams' rankings is small, teams which have
already clinched a spot in the playoffs tend to make more efforts to move up their rankings, so
that they will be able to play against relatively weaker opponents and have more home
advantages during the playoffs. Ratio of coaches' records is negatively associated with the ratio
of scores and significant at the 1% level. 10% increase in ratio of coaches' records will decrease
the ratio of score by 0.59%, which implies that coaches with better winning records are able to
lead the team with better performance. The coefficient of coaches' experience is not significant,
suggesting that the effect of coaches' experience on team performance is unclear.
The first column in Table 9 presents the estimation result of the 6 teams with high odds to
get into the playoffs. 𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ#,#:; and 𝑂𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ:,#:; are negatively related to team
performance, which are consistent with the results from my original model. However, the
coefficient of the ratio of salary dispersion is positive and insignificant, which is in contrast with
results I obtained from the first model. The coefficient of ratio of coaches' records is negative
and significant and the coefficient of ratio of coaches' experience is positive but insignificant.
Both these two estimation results are consistent with the results in the first model.
The second column in Table 9 shows the estimation result of the 6 teams with low odds
to get into playoff. Among the four dummy variables, only 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑚#,#:; is significant and its
coefficient is negative. This evidence supports the conclusions from Taylor and Oughton (2002)
that eliminate effect will affect the team performance, since teams that have been eliminate will
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make less winning efforts. The coefficient of ratio of salary dispersion is positive but not
significant in this group.
I use the two sample t-test to test the difference of coefficients among these two groups.
The p-value is 0.009 which shows that there is significant difference between two coefficients of
salary dispersion. This two-group fixed effect model based on playoff likelihoods suggests that
the effect of salary dispersion on team performance remains unclear. One potential explanation
for the insignificance of results is that the dataset I tested only includes 246 observations in total.
Further study can re-examine the model based on a bigger data set.
The first column in Table 10 shows the estimation results of 15 teams with more than five
transactions during that season. Results show that 𝑂𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚:,#:; is negatively related to team
performance. Average salary is positively and significantly related to team performance at 1%
level, while the salary dispersion is negatively and significantly related to team performance at 5%
level. These results are consistent with the results in the first model.
The second column in Table 10 shows the estimation results of remaining 15 teams made
less than five transactions during that season. Results shows that average salary is positively
related to team performance and salary dispersion is negatively related to team performance.
However, none of these two coefficients is significant. The effects of these two variables for
teams that trade less than 5 times is unclear.
Again, I use the two sample t-test to test the difference of coefficients among these two
groups. The p-value is less than 0.01, which implies that there is a significant difference between
the two coefficients of salary dispersion. Comparing the coefficients of each variable in these
two groups, I find that trade might increase the effects of salary dispersion and average salary on
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team performance. However, more studies are needed to explore the effect of trade on payrolls
and team performance.
Are the regular season results consistent with those in the playoffs?
Playoff teams always work on updating their team roster in March and early April before
the playoffs by signing free agents. These transaction behaviors are considered as a way to
increase team performance since elimination effects no longer exist in the playoffs. This fact
motivates me to re-examine the effect of trade in the playoffs. A data set was constructed by
using data from 172 playoff games in 2015-2016 season. The following model for season-level
data is considered:
𝑌#:; = 𝛽2 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙#:; + 𝛽@ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟#:; + 𝛽A 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑#:; + 𝛽D 𝑒𝑥𝑝#:; + 𝜇#: + 𝜀#;
Note that this equation is the same as equation 2, except for four dummy variables which are
used to control tournament incentive characteristics are no longer included in the model. There is
no more losing prize for the teams in the playoffs, therefore, teams will try their best to win each
game. Although players do not get paid in the playoffs, they will try their best in order to win the
title or get a bigger contract for the future season. Therefore, it is reasonable to use regular
season salary to measures the salary dispersion and test its effect on performance in the playoffs.
The estimation results are presented in Table 7. The fixed effects results indicate that the
relationship between salary dispersion and team performance is negative but insignificant, while
the relationship between average salary and team performance is positive and significant.
Comparing the coefficient of average salary in regular season to the coefficient of average salary
in the playoffs, I find that the impact of average salary on performance actually becomes bigger
in the playoffs. This evidence implies that teams that invest more money are more likely to win
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the title. If I had a bigger dataset, the effect of salary dispersion might turn out to be significant.
This research question is potentially worth exploring,

VI.

Implications
My results from the previous section have several implications. Since salary may have a

positive impact on team performance, it seems reasonable to increase the salary caps in the
leagues. Higher salaries will encourage the players to have better performance, and players need
to play better in order to obtain higher paying contracts in the future. However, by comparing the
coefficients of average salaries and salary dispersion from estimation results, I find that salary
dispersion has more impacts on team performance than average salary. Therefore, it might be
necessary to regulate the salary structures in order to increase the competitiveness and
performance of the league. One potential method is to redesign and improve the individual cap
policy, since individual cap does not improve the competitive balance in the NBA as efficiently
as payroll cap (Kesenne 2000). The 'Derrick Rose Rule' issued after 2011 is a great example of
improvement on individual cap policy. According to the rule, each team in the NBA can
nominate a player on his rookie contract to receive a "Designated Player" contract extension. A
Designated Player coming off his rookie contract may be eligible to earn 30% of the salary cap
(rather than the standard 25%) if he passes certain criteria. Through the 2017–18 season, in order
to be eligible, the player must be voted to start in two All-Star Games, or be named to an AllNBA Team twice (at any level), or be named MVP. On the one hand, this rule limits the ability
of rookie players to require bigger contracts. On the other hand, this rule encourages rookie
players to improve their performance so that they will have higher chance to be nominated as the
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'designated player'. My study suggests that more improvement needs to be done on individual
cap policy in order to stimulate the growth of team performance for the whole league.
I note that for one specific season, not all the teams aim to win the championship. Teams
with less possibilities to get into playoff tend to make less winning efforts so that they can move
down their standings and get higher possibilities to receive higher draft picks for the next season.
These teams sometimes are also willing to trade their star players for young and developing
players. Note that these teams will have lower payrolls which lead to worse team performance.
Consequently, the league will become competitively unbalanced. Hence, the league needs to set
the amount of the salary floor close to that of the salary cap so that teams will tend to have nearly
equal performance. Whenever the salary cap increases, an increase in salary floor must be
enforced. Although the NBA and NHL have instituted lottery systems in which teams with the
worst records have the best chance of securing the top draft pick but not sure to get it, the
incentive-to-lose behaviors are still very common in the NBA. Therefore, improvement needs to
be made on the lottery system. This is a tough problem for the league because it reduces the
possibility of the weaker team getting the top draft pick, which will also hurt the weaker teams.
According to Frick et al. (2003) and Berri and Jewell (2004), greater salary disparity
leads to better team performance in NBA. This is reasonable since teams with more star players
tend to have better performance, while star players earn higher salaries and cause the inequality
of wage distribution in the team. However, based on the results from both my study and
Katayama and Nuch (2011), teams with compressed salary structures tend to have better
performance in the current NBA. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that in recent
years, more and more players value championship above their salaries. These players are willing
to give up money to make the team better. For example, when LeBron James and Chris Bosh
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joined Miami Heats in 2010, both of them came at a cut rate. Miami Heats' star player, Dwayne
Wade took an even bigger discount in order for the Heats to recruit LeBron James and Chris
Bosh with limited salary cap space. This phenomenon has become more and more common in
recent years.
The negative relationship between salary dispersion and performance is found in my
study. Assume players' salaries reflect their productivity, it is important to build a team
consisting of all players with equal skills rather than make the team out of a few star players and
other mediocre players. However, in reality, teams in the NBA always spend heavily on star
players. For example, on July 14, 2016, NBA star guard, Michael Conley re-signed with the
Grizzlies for a five-year, $153 million deal, which is the greatest contract by total value in NBA
history. Why do teams spend so much money on buying a star player when they could use a
strategy of building a team out of equally skilled players to improve performance? One
explanation is provided by Berri and Jewell (2004), which studies the impact of star power in
NBA. They indicate that fans have a high preference of stars than on-court productivity. Star
players can attract more fans and a larger audience, thereby generating more revenue for the
owners, whose ultimate objective is to maximize profit. Moreover, teams can not only use star
players as signs of prominence to recruit more talented players, but also use them as attractive
transaction chips to trade for other players or picks.
My results of all six datasets show that ratio of coaches’ records is negative and
significant related to team performance. None of the estimation results show there is a significant
relationship between coaching experience and team performance. Therefore, one suggestion for
team owners in order to increase team performance is hiring coaches with better win records. It
is not clear whether coach experience is an important factor that affects team performance, since
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I only use the number of games coached as head coach to measure coaching experience. Further
study can re-examine this relationship by developing the measures. For instance, number of
games coached as an assistant coach also needs to be taken into account.

VII.

Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between within-team salary disparity on team

performance at the game level, using a salary dispersion measure based on actual players in the
game. My analysis reveals that salary dispersion has a significant negative effect on team
performance. The findings in this study appear to support the theories emphasizing the
importance of harmony among group members (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). As such, a
compressed salary structure leads to harmony among group members and thereby increases
productivity. However, the theory emphasizing the importance of harmony cannot be applied to
every team in the NBA or other sports leagues. Different teams may have different salary
structures for different purposes. I also found that team average salaries are an important
determinant of team performance. If the average salary among active players is high, the team is
more likely to actualize a win. A coaches' losing record always affects team performance
negatively, which suggests teams should hire coaches with winning records in order to improve
performance. I analyze the same regression model again by categorizing teams into two groups
and test whether different team situations affect the effect of salary dispersion. First, I categorize
the teams based on likelihoods of getting into playoff. One group includes 6 teams with high
odds of getting into the playoffs, while the other group includes 6 teams with low odds of getting
into the playoffs. The results show that the effect of salary dispersion on team peformance
remains unclear. Then, I also categorize the teams based on number of transactions each of them
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made. One group includes 15 teams trade more than 5 times and the other group includes 15
teams trade less than 5 times. Result from the first group shows that salary dispersion negatively
affects team performance, which is consistent with the results I found for my original model.
Note that my results do not generalize to other professional sports, as the number of players on
the field is larger in other sports such as baseball and football. However, the generalized model
can be applied to similar studies in other sports.
My study has several limitations. First, the conclusions above are all based on the fixed
effects estimator. Recall that Katayama and Nuch (2011) argue the average salary measure and
salary dispersion measure are endogenous variables; they depend on the number of gameminutes played by players and therefore are determined jointly with the game outcome.
Therefore, the results generated from the fixed effects model may be inconsistent. One potential
method for further study is to eliminate the fixed effects by differencing my Equation 2 and then
estimate the coefficient in the GMM framework, which provides the most efficient estimates on
the basis of moment conditions available. Second, my estimation model fails to take the sunkcosts effect into account. Staw and Hoang (1995) argue that draft order is an important predictor
of the game minutes played by each player. Therefore, further study needs to take draft order as a
control variable when using game-minute-adjusted formula to measure salary dispersion.
Another limitation of my study is that I am not able to interpret the effect of trade efficiently
based on the results I have. One potential methodology for future study is to analyze the
causality between trade and salary dispersion by using causal inference techniques. Note that my
study looks at the effects of trade and salary dispersion on team performance on average through
the season, using the causal inference techniques such as difference-in-difference to analyze the
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causality between trade and salary dispersion will allow me to have a closer look at the
immediate effect of trade.
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VIII.

Tables and Graphs

Table 1. Sample data (The first two games for Cleveland Cavaliers)

Table 2. Summary statistics (all 30 teams)
VARIABLES
Ratio of scores (y)
Ratio of average
salaries(avesal)
Ratio of dispersion
(disper)
Ratio of coaches'
experience (exp)
Ratio of coaches' records
(records)

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

1,230
1,230

0.983
1.322

0.131
1.486

0.580
0.0778

1.750
13.94

1,230

1.062

0.361

0.354

4.115

1,230

9.844

76.91

0.00217

1,777

1,230

1.097

0.546

0

5.321

Number of teams
30
Notes: These statistics are calculated using 1230 unique games. avesal refers to the ratio between
opposing teams of their minute-adjusted average salaries. disper refer to the ratio between
opposing teams of their minute-adjusted coefficient of variation of salaries. The ratio of caoches'
records refers to the ratio between opposing teams of their coaches' previous losing records,
where a losing record is the ratio of losses to total games. The ration of coaches' experience is the
ratio between opposing teams of their coaches' experience measured in game coached.
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Table 3. Summary statistics (6 teams with more than 90% possibilities to get into playoff)
VARIABLES
Ratio of scores (y)
Ratio of average
salaries(avesal)
Ratio of dispersion (disper)
Ratio of coaches' experience
(exp)
Ratio of coaches' records
(records)

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

246
246

1.052
1.840

.143
1.962

.724
.290

1.750
13.942

.414
.002

2.090
1777

0

3.490

246 .972
.290
246 21.745 160.538
246

.789

.454

Number of teams
6
Notes: These statistics are calculated using 246 unique games. For the description of each
variable, please see the notes below Table 2.

Table 4. Summary statistics (6 teams with less than 5% possibilities to get into playoff)
VARIABLES
Ratio of scores (y)
Ratio of average
salaries(avesal)
Ratio of dispersion (disper)
Ratio of coaches' experience
(exp)
Ratio of coaches' records
(records)

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

246
246

.935
1.131

.106
.165

.610
.165

1.320
11.630

246
246

1.171
1.460

.435
17.124

.354
.008

4.115
201

246

5.064

.585

0

5.259

Number of teams
6
Notes: These statistics are calculated using 246 unique games. For the description of each
variable, please see the notes below Table 2.
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Table 5. Summary statistics (15 teams trade more than 5 times during that season)
VARIABLES
Ratio of scores (y)
Ratio of average
salaries(avesal)
Ratio of dispersion
(disper)
Ratio of coaches'
experience (exp)
Ratio of coaches' records
(records)

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

615
615

0.967
1.191

0.125
1.468

0.580
0.078

1.461
13.94

615

1.057

0.366

0.354

4.115

615

6.517

28.14

0.005

563

615

1.141

0.565

0

5.321

Number of teams
15
Notes: These statistics are calculated using 615 unique games. For the description of each
variable, please see the notes below Table 2.

Table 6. Summary statistics (15 teams trade less than 5 times during that season)
VARIABLES
Ratio of scores (y)
Ratio of average
salaries(avesal)
Ratio of dispersion
(disper)
Ratio of coaches'
experience (exp)
Ratio of coaches' records
(records)

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

615
615

0.999
1.453

0.136
1.492

0.610
0.290

1.750
12.61

615

1.067

0.355

0.432

2.569

615

13.17

105

0.002

1,777

615

1.052

0.524

0

4.670

Number of teams
15
Notes: These statistics are calculated using 615 unique games. For the description of each
variable, please see the notes below Table 2.
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Table 7. Summary statistics (16 teams in playoff)
VARIABLES
Ratio of scores (y)
Ratio of average
salaries(avesal)
Ratio of dispersion
(disper)
Ratio of coaches'
experience (exp)
Ratio of coaches' records
(records)

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

86
86

0.931
1.268

0.149
1.417

0.648
0.096

1.299
9.816

86

1.078

0.386

0.451

2.145

86

4.200

6.413

0.053

19.786

86

1.199

0.524

.308

3.32

Number of teams
16
Notes: These statistics are calculated using 86 unique games. For the description of each
variable, please see the notes below Table 2 and 3.
Table 8. Estimation results (all 30 teams)
VARIABLES
Clinch
Oclinch
Elim
Oelim
avesal
disper
records
exp
Constant
Observations
Number of teams
R-squared

(1)
Fixed Effects
-0.043***
(0.012)
-0.030**
(0.014)
-0.019
(0.013)
0.057***
(0.014)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.028**
(0.011)
-0.059***
(0.010)
-2.83e-05*
(1.40e-05)
1.072***
(0.019)
1,230
30
0.103
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Notes: Clinch refers to the dummy variable that determines whether the team has clinched
playoff spot. Oclinch refers to the dummy variable that determines whether the opponents team
has clinched playoff spot. Elim refers to the dummy variable that determines whether the team
has eliminated from playoff. Oelim refers to the dummy variable that determines whether the
opponent team has eliminated from playoff. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 9. Estimation results (Categorizing teams into two groups based on odds of getting into
playoffs)
VARIABLES

Clinch
Oclinch
Elim
Oelim
avesal
disper
records
exp
Constant

(1)
Fixed Effects
(high playoff
likelihoods)

(2)
Fixed Effects
(low playoff
likelihoods)

-0.046**
(0.013)
-0.059*
(0.026)
-

-

0.051
(0.029)
0.0002
(0.003)
0.008
(0.024)
-0.095**
(0.034)
-2.85e-05**
(1.06e-05)

0.0001
(0.029)
-0.032**
(0.009)
0.028
(0.030)
0.011
(0.007)
0.002
(0.027)
-0.037*
(0.015)
-0.0004
(0.0004)

1.128***
(0.0395)

0.980***
(0.037)

Observations
246
246
R-squared
0.106
0.092
Number of teams
6
6
Notes: Column 1 presents the results for 6 teams with high possibilities to get into playoff and
column 2 presents the results for the rest 6 teams with low possibilities to get into playoff. For
the descriptions of each variable, please see the notes below Table 2 and 8. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 10. Estimation results (Categorizing into two groups based on numbers of transactions the
team made)
VARIABLES

Clinch
Oclinch
Elim
Oelim
avesal
disper
records
exp
Constant

(1)
Fixed Effects
(High number
of trades)

(2)
Fixed Effects
(Low number
of trades)

-0.027
(0.022)
-0.030
(0.018)
-0.014
(0.015)
0.059***
(0.020)
0.009**
(0.004)
-0.031*
(0.014)
-0.045***
(0.012)
-0.0001
(8.21e-05)
1.040***
(0.029)

-0.049***
(0.015)
-0.033
(0.021)
-0.024
(0.023)
0.052**
(0.018)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.022
(0.018)
-0.078***
(0.013)
-2.72e-05***
(7.34e-06)
1.104***
(0.022)

Observations
615
615
R-squared
0.094
0.121
Numbers of teams
15
15
Notes: Column 1 presents the results for 15 teams trade more than 5 times during that season and
column 2 presents the results for the rest 15 teams trade less than 5 times during that season. For
the descriptions of each variable, please see the notes below Table 2 and 8. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 11. Estimation results (16 teams in the playoffs)
VARIABLES
avesal
disper
records
exp
Constant

(1)
Fixed Effects
(Playoffs)
0.019***
(0.004)
-0.106
(0.071)
-0.027
(0.038)
-0.009***
(0.003)
1.091***
(0.065)

Observations
86
Number of teams
16
R-squared
0.199
Notes: For the descriptions of each variable, please see the notes below Table 2 and 8. Robust
standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
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